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Abstract 
For sexual offence complainants, testifying is an intrusive process where they must discuss 
sensitive and distressing information about themselves and the incident which has occurred. 
Traditionally, one of the primary concerns for these complainants was that evidence of their 
previous sexual experiences would be introduced. The use of such evidence has been 
curtailed somewhat by rape shield provisions like sections 41-43 of the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999. However, a residual concern for sexual offence complainants is 
disclosure of personal records such as therapeutic or social work records at trial. Despite 
increasing applications for access to such material, there is no specific law to regulate such 
access in England. Applications are dealt with in an ad hoc manner according to the general 
rules on disclosure in criminal trials. This article considers the current approach to disclosure 
of sexual offence complainants’ personal records. Principled concerns about the admission of 
this information in trials are highlighted and proposals for increased regulation of the use of 
personal records are put forward, using Canadian law as a potential blueprint for reform.  
  
Introduction 
Because so many sexual offence trials turn onto the “oath against oath nature” any method of 
challenging the credibility of the complainant’s testimony is important for the defence. 
Traditionally, a popular means of doing this was introducing evidence of the complainant’s 
sexual history to suggest that she was likely to have consented to the impugned sexual 
encounter, or, historically, that she was unchaste and thus likely to be mendacious also. 
“Rape shield” legislation as now found in sections 41-43 of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 has now made it more difficult for the defence to introduce sexual 
experience evidence. Another means of challenging complainants’ credibility that has 
increasingly been relied on is the use of personal records such as social work, counselling and 
therapeutic, medical or educational records. These files are mined for inconsistencies in the 
complainant’s account or retractions of the allegation. Perhaps even more problematically, 
this material can be used to direct jurors’ attention away from the alleged incident and place 
undue focus on issues such as mental illness or drug use which may prejudice the 
complainant in the eyes of the jury. The admission of personal records is undesirable for a 
complainant, revealing information which will not only invade her1 privacy but also 
potentially unfairly prejudice her testimony.  
 The increasing tendency to seek disclosure of personal records has been highlighted in 
case-law.2 In R. v H(L)3, Sedley J (as he then was) suggested that  
“[i]t has become standard practice for defence lawyers in rape and indecency cases to 
seek to compel the production of any social services, education, psychiatric, medical 
or similar records concerning the complainant, in the hope that these will furnish 
material for cross-examination”.4 
 
This article considers the use of personal records in sexual offence trials. Principled concerns 
about the introduction of such records at trial will be explained and the current regulation of 
their admissibility in criminal trials will be critiqued. In light of these criticisms, drawing on 
the Canadian Criminal Code, proposals for reform of the rules in this area are suggested. 
 
Principled Concerns about the Use of Personal Records in Sexual Offence Trials 
Arguments for the use of personal records are based on the “equality of arms” principle under 
Article 6 of the ECHR which obliges the prosecution to disclose to the defence all material in 
their possession for or against the defendant.5 The defence entitlement to disclosure may only 
be curtailed where this is “strictly necessary” and “any difficulties caused to the defence by a 
limitation on its rights must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by 
the judicial authorities”.6 However, there are many concerns about disclosure of personal 
records which warrant a measured approach to the introduction of this evidence. The obvious 
problem with the use of personal records in sexual offence trials is the intrusion into 
complainants’ privacy and the consequent distress experienced when highly personal 
information is disclosed to the defence and then potentially introduced at trial. States have a 
                                                          
1 Complainants and defendants are referred to, respectively, in the feminine and masculine gender. This is done 
for simplicity and is justified on the basis that, in general, the majority of adult sexual offences are committed by 
men upon women.  
2 R. v Reading Justices, ex parte Berkshire County Council [1996] 2 FCR 535 at 542; R. v Brushett [2000] All 
ER 2432. 
3 [1997] 1 Cr App Rep 176.  
4 Ibid, 177-178. Similar comments were made in M. v Director of Legal Aid Casework v The Lord Chancellor, 
The Helen Bamber Foundation [2014] EWHC 1355 (Admin), discussed below. 
5 Rowe and Davis v United Kingdom (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 1, para 60. 
6 Ibid, para 54. See also: Dowsett v UK (2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 845. 
positive obligation under Article 8 of the ECHR7 to protect an individual’s right to privacy. 
Further, the European Court has held that an individual’s privacy should not be unjustifiably 
infringed in criminal proceedings.8 Thus, it is incumbent upon the English legislature to 
ensure that the law is sufficiently robust to protect complainants’ privacy by limiting 
disclosure of personal information to where this is strictly necessary.  
 
 Another concern for complainants is the potential for information from personal 
records if introduced in evidence, to prejudice their credibility unfairly . Ellison suggests that 
“jurors are likely to attach exaggerated significance to psychiatric evidence” and “this is 
likely to have an irrational, distorting influence on juror decision-making to the prejudice of 
the…complainant and the fact-finding process”.9 Whilst observing rape trials, Smith found 
that in most of the full trials she attended, defence advocates attempted to portray 
complainants as “delusional” because they were “damaged”.10 This tactic was supported by 
“questions about medical conditions, previous traumas or counselling records unrelated to 
counts on the indictment”.11 Even where personal records do not reveal evidence of mental 
health issues, it is likely that they contain other information which could be used by the 
defence to improperly impugn a complainant’s credibility. For example, social work or 
medical files may contain references to drug use or incidents with social workers which could 
be introduced to suggest that a complainant is not a worthy or reliable victim.  These 
strategies unfairly influence jurors’ perceptions of the complainant’s credibility. 
 
 In addition to complainants’ concerns about inadequate protection from disclosure 
regimes, there are the concerns from record-holders’ that their interests must be recognised. 
Many organisations likely to be subject to applications (e.g. local authorities or counselling 
services provided by victims’ organisations) operate on scarce resources. They should not 
have to expend valuable funds representing themselves to resist disclosure applications  at 
                                                          
7 X and Y v Netherlands (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 235, para 23. This right to privacy includes privacy in personal 
records: Z v Finland (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 371, para 95.  
8 Doorson v Netherlands (1996) 23 E.H.R.R. 330. 
9 L. Ellison, “The Use and Abuse of Psychiatric Evidence in Rape Trials” (2009) 13 IJE&P, 28, 36. 
10 O. Smith, Court Responses to Rape and Sexual Assault: An Observation of Sexual Violence Trials, PhD 
Thesis, (University of Bath: 2013), 197. Available at: 
http://ww2.anglia.ac.uk/ruskin/en/home/faculties/alss/deps/hss/staff0/olivia_smith/olivia_smith_research.Mainc
ontent.0010.file.tmp/olivia_smith_thesis.pdf (Accessed 20 June, 2015).  
11 Ibid. 
hearings unless this is absolutely necessary. The potential for these records to be disclosed 
may also impact on how these professionals operate. If the likelihood of disclosure is high, 
record-keepers may minimise their note-taking or cease taking notes. This can impinge upon 
their ability to monitor their clients’ care. There are also wider societal interests to be 
considered. Society has an interest in victims reporting sexual crime and rehabilitating by 
receiving counselling or access to medical and social services.12 If complainants fear that 
personal records will be disclosed at trial, they may choose between reporting and seeking 
therapeutic support, deciding to report and not get support or vice versa. Such outcomes are 
not socially desirable as they minimise the potential for both bringing sex offenders to justice 
and rehabilitating victims.  
 
 A final pragmatic concern about disclosure relates to the usefulness of personal 
records as evidence. These records represent the recorder’s interpretation of an interchange 
and are not necessarily an accurate account of what the complainant said or of her behaviour 
at the time the records were made. The potential for inaccuracy is increased by the fact that, 
unlike police statements, complainants do not have the opportunity to read the notes to ensure 
that they are an accurate reflection of their communications.13 Thus, the contents should be 
treated with caution, the weight that can be attached to them within a trial, save in exceptional 
circumstances, is debatable.  
 
 The Current Rules Relating to Disclosure in Sexual Offence Cases 
Since personal records are held by local authorities and therapeutic professionals who are not 
party to the trial and not by the prosecution, the normal procedure for disclosure between the 
prosecution and defence does not automatically apply. However, although third parties are 
not obliged to disclose material in criminal trials, it is possible that personal records held by 
third parties may be disclosed in sexual offence trials. The prosecution must disclose to the 
defence both the evidence it will rely on at trial and any “unused material” (i.e. relevant 
material which is not part of the prosecution case). Third party material may be subject to this 
general duty of disclosure if the police or prosecution have accessed it while investigating 
                                                          
12 J. Temkin, “Digging the Dirt: Disclosure of Records in Sexual Assault Cases” (2002) 61 Cambridge L.J. 126, 
131-132. 
13 A. Cossins, “Contempt or Confidentiality?” (1996) 21 Alternative L.J. 223, 227. 
and preparing the case. The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 199614 (CPIA) and 
accompanying Code of Practice impose an obligation to pursue all reasonable lines of 
enquiry whether these point towards or away from the suspect.15 The Attorney General’s 
Guidelines on Disclosure require an investigator, disclosure officer or prosecutor to take 
reasonable steps “to identify, secure and consider material held by any third party where it 
appears…(a) that such material exists and (b) that it may be relevant to an issue in the 
case”.16 If the prosecution knows that personal records exist and are potentially relevant and 
they have not already been disclosed during the investigation, they may seek to access them. 
The CPS Guidance highlights three scenarios which may occur when the police or 
prosecution seek access to a complainant’s personal records: voluntary disclosure; qualified 
disclosure or; refusal to disclose. The first two scenarios are regulated by the CPIA and the 
latter is dealt with via the witness summons procedure. 
 
Voluntary Disclosure 
When the complainant gives informed consent allowing access to records and service of 
records as additional or unused material as appropriate, disclosure is straightforward.17 The 
material becomes part of the prosecution’s unused material and is subject to the relevant rules 
on disclosure. Where the complainant is a child, the 2013 Protocol and Good Practice 
Model: Disclosure of information in cases of alleged child abuse and linked criminal and 
care directions hearings18 will apply. The Protocol seeks “[t]o provide for timely 
consultation between the CPS and the Local Authority where Local Authority material 
satisfies the test in [the CPIA] for disclosure to the defence”.19 Although the Protocol is not 
binding, it represents best practice and should be consulted in all relevant cases.20 Where the 
                                                          
14 As amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2003.  
15 Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), Legal Guidance on Rape and Sexual Offences, available at: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/rape_and_sexual_offences/ (Accessed June 24, 2015). Hereafter “CPS 
Guidance”.  
16 Attorney General’s Office, Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure: For investigators, prosecutors and 
defence practitioners, (London: Attorney General’s Office, 2013, para 56. Hereafter “Attorney General’s 
Guidelines”. The Judicial Protocol on Disclosure of Unused Material in Criminal Cases imposes a similar 
requirement: Judiciary of England and Wales, Judicial Protocol on the Disclosure of Unused Material in 
Criminal Cases, (London: Judiciary of England and Wales, 2013), para 44. Hereafter “Judicial Protocol”. 
17 CPS Guidance, available at: http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/rape_and_sexual_offences/ (Accessed June 
24, 2015). Hereafter “CPS Guidance”. 
18 Available at: http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/third_party_protocol_2013.pdf (Accessed June 24, 
2015).   
19 Ibid, para 3.7. 
20 Judicial Protocol, para 45.  
complainant is an adult, some Crown Court centres have developed local protocols which are 
similarly designed to simplify the disclosure process.21 Whether these protocols encourage 
voluntary disclosure is unclear. If voluntary disclosure occurs, section 3 of the CPIA provides 
that the prosecution must disclose unused material to the defence if it “might reasonably be 
considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused, or of 
assisting the case for the accused”.22 “[S]omething can be said to be undermined if it becomes 
more likely to fall (or fail) as a result”.23 Thus, personal records which contain recantations of 
the allegation or other information which may undermine the complainant’s credibility could 
qualify for disclosure. 
 
Qualified Disclosure 
Qualified disclosure occurs where disclosure is made to the police and/or prosecution with 
the caveat that the records will not be disclosed to the defence.24 If the prosecution feels that 
the records should form part of the prosecution case or be disclosed to the defence, consent 
must be obtained.25 If consent is withheld, the prosecutor must decide whether to apply for 
non-disclosure on public interest immunity (PII) grounds.26 The prosecution must apply in 
writing for a hearing. The defence will be notified and given an opportunity to make 
representations.27 The complainant and record-holder are also likely to be permitted to make 
representations.28 Court applications for withholding sensitive material should be rare.29 The 
judgment in R. v H30 established a very strict test for non-disclosure on PII grounds. Noting 
the “golden rule of full disclosure”, Lord Bingham stated that derogation from this principle 
required the court to consider the type of material which the prosecution seeks to withhold 
and whether it is capable of weakening the prosecution case or strengthening the defence 
                                                          
21 CPS Guidance. 
22 If material comes into the possession of the prosecution after the initial requirement of disclosure is satisfied 
this too must be disclosed if it satisfied these criteria and it has not been previously been disclosed: CPIA, s 
7A(2). 
23 D. Ormerod, (ed), Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2015 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), para D9.15. 
24 CPS Guidance. 
25 Ibid. See also: Attorney General’s Guidelines, para 58. 
26 The CPS Guidance states that an alternative choice for the prosecution where permission to use the records is 
refused is to discontinue the case.  The prosecution may also claim PII where the defence has made an 
application for disclosure of unused prosecution material under section 8 of the CPIA. 
27 Rule 15.3 of the Criminal Procedure Rules outlines the procedure for PII applications.  
28 Section 16 of the CPIA.  
29 Crown Prosecution Service, Disclosure Manual, para 13.2, available at: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/d_to_g/disclosure_manual/ (Accessed January 15, 2015). See also: Attorney 
General’s Guidelines, para 65.  
30 R. v H and others [2004] 2 AC 134. 
case. If the material satisfies these requirements, a judge must decide whether there is a “real 
risk of serious prejudice to an important public interest” if full disclosure is ordered.31 Even if 
such risk exists, a judge must determine how limited disclosure might be made so as to 
minimise interference with this public interest whilst still adequately protecting defendants’ 
rights. If limited disclosure is ordered, the restrictions imposed must “represent the minimum 
derogation necessary to protect the public interest in question”.32  
 Lord Bingham stated that “[t]here will be very few cases indeed in which some 
measure of disclosure to the defence will not be possible”.33 The judge must consider 
carefully both the relevance of the records and whether the public interest in protecting 
complainants’ Article 8 rights and the confidentiality of relationships between record-holders 
and clients is sufficiently strong to justify non-disclosure or modified disclosure. Given the 
strength of defendants’ Article 6 rights, withholding records on PII grounds seems unlikely if 
a sufficient degree of relevance is shown. It is probable that at least a redacted version will be 
disclosed. 
 
Assessing the CPIA Regime 
In 2013, the Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (HMCPSI) published a review of CPS 
compliance with rules and guidance on disclosure of complainants’ medical records and 
counselling notes in rape and sexual offence cases.34 The review focussed on a sample of 58 
cases where the unused material included complainants’ records and/or counselling notes.35 
Prosecutors did not consider the complainant’s records to ascertain if any or all of them were 
disclosable under the CPIA in 4 out of 50 relevant cases.36 In 37 cases, records should have 
been disclosed. This was not properly undertaken in 5 cases.37 There was also evidence of 
unwarranted disclosure. Of the 32 cases where records and notes were disclosed, there were 7 
that did not fully comply with the prosecution’s duty of disclosure.38 In 5 cases, only some of 
                                                          
31 Ibid, para 36. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid, para 37. 
34 HMCPSI, Disclosure of medical records and counselling notes: A review of CPS compliance with rules and 
guidance in relation to disclosure of complainants’ medical records and counselling notes in rape and sexual 
offence cases, (London: HMCPSI, 2013).  
35 Ibid, para 1.6.  
36 Ibid, para 2.4. 
37 Ibid, para 2.10. 
38 Ibid, para 2.13. 
the material was disclosable but the prosecutor had disclosed all of the document(s) and did 
not redact the material sufficiently or at all.39 In 2 cases, medical records were disclosed in 
breach of the CPIA.40 Although the over-disclosure did not have an adverse impact on the 
cases, it was an apparent breach of the complainant’s right to privacy.41 It is also a breach of 
the CPIA regime. The CPS Guidance recommends that “only material satisfying the 
disclosure test (capable of undermining the prosecution case or assisting the case for the 
accused) should be disclosed to the defence” and that “[u]nder no circumstances should there 
be blanket disclosure”.42 The review also reveals the absence of a uniform procedure for 
obtaining complainants’ consent to disclosure or for recording the level of consent given (e.g. 
whether it was only for disclosure to the prosecution or included disclosure to the defence).43  
 
 Although a relatively small sample was involved, this review raises some concerns. 
There is evidence of inconsistency in the application of the rules, with the CPIA procedure 
not being accurately applied in some instances. The potential for both inappropriate non-
disclosure and over-disclosure is also apparent. The latter is a significant problem from a 
complainant’s perspective, raising the possibility of unwarranted breaches of privacy rights. 
Furthermore, non-disclosure of potentially relevant information is worrying as defendants’ 
rights may be infringed. The lack of a standardised consent procedure is also problematic. 
Complainants might consent to disclosing their records without fully comprehending the 
repercussions. Moreover, the failure accurately to record the level of consent given could 
result in qualified consent to disclosure solely to the prosecution being read as full consent 
and inappropriate disclosure being made. Consequently, although the review is largely 
positive, it is questionable whether the current CPIA regime can consistently achieve fair 
results. There are no available data on PII applications but it is clear that defendants’ rights 
are highly likely to prevail here and justify disclosure in a high proportion of cases. Whilst it 
is important to protect defendants’ rights, especially in light of Article 6 protections, the 
current system is ill-equipped to give adequate weight to complainants’ privacy concerns or 
indeed wider principled objections to the use of such records in sexual offence trials in 
                                                          
39 Ibid, para 2.14. 
40 Ibid, para 2.15. 
41 Ibid, para 2.16.  
42 CPS Guidance. 
43 Of the 32 cases where material was disclosed, it was clear that consent had been obtained in 7. It was not clear 
whether consent had been obtained or not in the remaining 25: HMCPSI, Disclosure of medical records and 
counselling notes, (2013), para 3.8. 
decision-making about disclosure. There is space for greater accommodation of these factors, 
whilst still affording appropriate protection to defendants’ rights. 
 
Refusal to Disclose: The Witness Summons Procedure  
Since the CPIA only applies where the prosecution has access to personal records, an 
alternative procedure must be followed where complainant refuses to grant any access to her 
records. Where a complainant does not consent to release of records, the prosecution must 
seek access if they believe that it is reasonable to do so.44 The witness summons procedure 
may be used to require the third party to attend court and give evidence or produce the 
relevant documents. The defence may also use this procedure if they believe that a third party 
holds potentially relevant records that have not already been sought by the prosecution.45 A 
witness summons will be granted where it is proved that (a) a person is likely to be able to 
give or produce material evidence and (b) it is in the interests of justice to issue a summons to 
secure that person’s attendance.46  
 
 Where counselling or therapeutic records are sought, a written application is 
required.47 The application must be served on the record-holder and the person to whom the 
record relates will probably be notified.48 A summons cannot be issued unless everyone 
served with the application has had at least fourteen days to make representations and the 
court is satisfied that it has been able to take adequate account of the duties and rights of the 
record-holder and of any person to whom the proposed evidence relates.49 The summons may 
be resisted on the basis that (a) the records are not likely to be material evidence or (b) the 
duties or rights of the record-holder or of another interested party outweigh the reasons for 
issuing a summons. The Court may require the record-holder to make the records available 
                                                          
44 Ibid. Attorney General’s Guidelines, para 57. 
45 Judicial Protocol, para 48. 
46 Section 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965, as amended by Part 5 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003. Where the proceedings occur in the Magistrate’s Court, the equivalent provision is 
section 97 of the Magistrate’s Courts Act 1980, as amended. 
47 Rule 17.5 of the Criminal Procedure Rules.  
48 Rule 17.5(3) 
49 Rule 17.5(4). 
for inspection50 and might invite him/her or a person to whom the records relate to help the 
court to assess the objection.51  
 
 Whoever seeks production of documents must prove that they are “likely to be 
material”, likelihood for this purpose involving a real possibility, although not necessarily a 
probability.52 This procedure must not be used as a disguised attempt to obtain discovery53 or 
as a “fishing expedition”.54 For example, it would be impermissible to call for the entirety of 
the files held by the local authority where it is known that a complainant has been involved 
with social services.55  The applicant must demonstrate that the documents are requested 
because of a properly formed instinct that something in them is relevant to determining the 
defendant’s guilt. Ultimately, deciding whether the records sought are material within the 
meaning of the legislation is a matter for judicial discretion. If the records are found to be 
“material”, PII claims must be assessed with reference to the R. v H test.56 Given the large 
degree of discretion allowed to judges, it is difficult to predict whether disclosure will be 
granted. However, owing to the strict approach to determining PII claims in R. v H, it appears 
that if the records are seen to be relevant, there will be some level of disclosure, at least in 
redacted form.  
  
Research published by Temkin and Krahé provides some insights into the use of the witness 
summons procedure. They conducted interviews with 17 judges and 7 barristers in 2003.57 
Although the sample is small and the research is dated, without more recent or detailed data, 
the primary findings are noteworthy. Temkin and Krahé concluded that applications for third 
party disclosure of personal records were common and the interviews suggested that the rules 
                                                          
50 Rule 17.6(2). 
51 Rule 17.6(3).  
52 R. v Reading Justices ex parte Berkshire County Council [1996] 2 FCR 535, 542-543. 
53 Ibid. 
54 See: R v H(L) [1997] 1 Cr App R 176, 177-178; Judicial Protocol, para 44. 
55 HHJ. Cutts, “Disclosure” in P. Rook and R. Ward, Rook and Ward on Sexual Offences: Law and Practice, 4th 
edn (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2010), para 25.86. 
56 In Reading Justices, Brown LJ emphasised that the question of whether the evidence is material must be 
answered before any question of PII can arise: [1996] 2 FCR 535, 542.  
57 These interviews were conducted as part of a study into the use of sexual history evidence in rape trials: L. 
Kelly, J. Temkin and S. Griffiths, Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history evidence 
in rape trials, (London: Home Office, 2006). The findings from the interviews were first published by Temkin 
and Krahé: J. Temkin and B. Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude, (Portland, 
Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2008),   
in this area are not applied coherently.58 The findings also indicated that fishing expeditions 
were commonplace and were not necessarily looked upon disfavourably by judges. For 
example, one barrister who mostly defended stated that fishing expeditions were made by 
defence counsel on a regular basis and that frequently there was no problem in succeeding 
with such applications.59 The interviews with judges suggested that judges did not take a 
uniform approach to speculative requests for disclosure, with some suggesting that 
speculative requests would not necessarily be dismissed.60 Finally, the research showed that 
although local authorities have a positive duty to claim PII61, some did not do so.62 Although 
there were authorities who required the section 2 procedure to be followed and appointed 
counsel to go through the documents and claim PII where appropriate63, the costs involved 
deterred other authorities from this approach.64 The research was conducted prior to the 
amendment which permitted complainants to make representations at disclosure hearings.65 
Thus, there is no evidence on the rate at which complainants make representations or the 
effect which this has on application outcomes. 
 As this research is dated, it would be imprudent to draw conclusions on the use of the 
witness summons procedure from it, especially in light of subsequent developments such as 
the introduction of the Judicial Protocol in 2013 which provides strict guidance on the 
appropriate use of witness summonses. However, given the highly discretionary nature of the 
current rules, it cannot be assumed that subsequent initiatives have entirely eradicated the 
potential for inappropriate disclosure. The recent judgment in M v Director of Legal Aid 
Casework v The Lord Chancellor, The Helen Bamber Foundation66 indicates that despite 
reforms, the potential for misapplication of the witness summons procedure identified in 
Temkin and Krahé’s research prevails. M alleged that she was raped by her former husband. 
The CPS sought a witness summons to access notes from counselling sessions M obtained 
from the Helen Bamber organisation, part of which referred to the rape allegations. M 
objected on confidentiality grounds. Although the judgment deals with judicial review of the 
decision not to grant M legal aid for representation at the witness summons application, 
                                                          
58 Ibid, at 157. 
59 Ibid, at 155.  
60 Ibid. 
61 R. v Higgins [1996] 2 FCR 612, 615. 
62 Temkin and Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap, (2008), 157.  
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Rule 17.6(3).  
66 [2014] EWHC 1355 (Admin). 
Coulson J’s comments highlight some shortcomings regarding the use of witness summonses 
in these cases.  
 
 In part due to the complications regarding the legal aid applications, there were three 
disclosure hearings in this case. The first was adjourned to allow more time to resolve the 
application for civil aid. At the subsequent hearing HHJ Parker QC ruled that four pages of 
counselling notes should be disclosed to the CPS but that the witness summons should not be 
executed for a few days and in the interim, the complainant could apply for non-disclosure on 
PII grounds.67 Coulson J noted that this was unusual and departed from guidance68 which 
states that the recipient of a summons is entitled to resist disclosure on PII grounds without 
having to issue her own application.69 Nevertheless, the complainant made an application for 
PII within the time limit. There was a third hearing where it was held that the notes were not 
material and even if they were, disclosure would be a disproportionate interference with the 
claimant’s Article 8 rights.70 Referring to the hearings in this case, Coulson J commented 
negatively on the current trends in disclosure of personal records: 
“It is becoming increasingly common for the CPS to issue witness summonses of this 
kind, seeking medical and other such records concerning a complainant in an assault 
or sex case. In my experience, these applications are often made somewhat lazily, in 
the belief that, if there are some records which may have some relevance, the CPS is 
fulfilling its obligations to the defendant, and to the administration of justice, by 
issuing the witness summons and then putting the burden of resolving the issues 
raised onto others (namely the defendant, the complainant and the judge). In my view, 
considerably greater analysis is required before any such summons is issued. As a 
general rule it is not good enough, as this witness summons seeks to do, merely to 
require the documents on the general basis that they might undermine the prosecution 
or help the defence.”71 
 
This case highlights some concerns about inappropriate application of the witness summons 
procedure. The uncertainty regarding the application process is likely to distress complainants 
who have to withstand a number of hearings and delays before knowing whether records will 
be disclosed. This misapplication of the rules also evidences a tendency for slippage in the 
                                                          
67 Ibid, para 9. 
68 J. Richardson, (ed), Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2014, 62nd edn (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2013), para 8-12. 
69 [2014] EWHC 1355 (Admin), para 9. 
70 Ibid, para 10. 
71 Ibid, para 12. 
application of the rules generally which could lead to inconsistent and unpredictable 
outcomes. The CPS practice of erring on the side of obtaining disclosure creates a high risk 
of unwarranted disclosure or at the very least another trauma for complainants if applications 
are unnecessarily made (even if not granted as in M.). Coupled with the findings from 
Temkin and Krahé’s research, the suitability of the witness summons procedure for 
adequately protecting complainants’ privacy is doubtful.  
 
 Both the CPIA regime and the witness summons procedure could be improved to 
provide greater certainty and protection for sexual offence complainants’ privacy. Both 
procedures are unpredictable and this uncertainty is magnified by the fact that two separate 
regimes apply. It is unclear which is used most often or when disclosure of personal records 
is legally justified. Consequently, it is difficult to predict when records will be disclosed to 
the defence. This is problematic for complainants who have no guarantees regarding the 
privacy of their personal records once they report a sexual offence. This uncertainty also 
creates problems for the defence who cannot be sure whether access to potentially 
exculpating evidence will be granted. Moreover, neither regime expressly provides for 
consideration of complainants’ interests or wider principled concerns about the use of such 
records in sexual offence trials when making decisions on disclosure. It is thus worth 
considering whether there is potential for the introduction of a unified regime which would 
more tightly and predictably control disclosure of personal records. 
 
Devising a solution to the problems in this area: Lessons from Canada72 
Section 278 of the Canadian Criminal Code provides a statutory scheme for the regulation of 
disclosure of personal records in sexual offence trials which may provide a suitable blueprint 
for reform. In section 278, a “record” is defined as “any form of record that contains personal 
information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy”.73 This includes, but is not 
limited to, “medical, psychiatric, therapeutic, counselling, education, employment, child 
                                                          
72 The author has elsewhere recommended the introduction of the Canadian scheme in Ireland: S. Leahy, “The 
Defendant’s Rights or a Bridge too Far? Regulating Defence Access to Complainants’ Counselling Records in 
Trials for Sexual Offences- Part 1” (2012) 22 I.C.L.J. 13 and Part 2 (2012) 22 I.C.L.J. 34. A scheme similar to 
section 278 has been included in the Irish Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Bill 2015. 
73 S. 278.1. 
welfare, adoption and social services records, personal journals and diaries”.74 The rules 
apply to records held by both the prosecution and third parties.75 However, where the 
prosecution holds the record, the complainant may waive the application of the scheme.76  
 
 Disclosure under section 278 is a two-stage process. The first stage (production stage) 
begins with an application to the trial judge.77 This written application must include: 
 
(a) particulars identifying the record that the accused seeks to have produced and the 
name of the record-holder; and 
(b) the grounds on which the accused relies to establish that the record is likely relevant to 
an issue at trial or the competence of a witness to testify.78 
 
To prevent speculative applications, section 278.3(4) lists grounds for seeking records which, 
on their own, are insufficient to establish that the record is “likely relevant”. These include 
assertions that the record: 
(a) exists; 
(b) relates to medical or psychiatric treatment, therapy or counselling that the complainant 
or witness has received or is receiving; 
(c) relates to the incident that is the subject-matter of the proceedings; 
(d) may disclose a prior inconsistent statement of the complainant or witness; 
(e) may relate to the credibility of the complainant or witness; 
(f) may relate to the reliability of the testimony of the complainant or witness merely 
because the complainant or witness has received or is receiving psychiatric treatment, 
therapy or counselling; 
(g) may reveal allegations of sexual abuse of the complainant by a person other than the 
accused; 
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75 S. 278.2(2). When the prosecutor holds the records, defendants must be informed but the contents of the 
records must not be disclosed: s. 278.2(3). 
76 S. 278.2(2).  
77 S. 278.3(1). 
78 S. 278.3(3).  
(h) relates to the sexual activity of the complainant with any person, including the 
accused; 
(i) relates to the presence or absence of a recent complaint; 
(j) relates to the complainant’s sexual reputation; or 
(k) was made close in time to a complaint or to the activity that forms the subject-matter 
of the charge against the accused. 
 
The defendant must serve the application on the prosecutor, the record-holder, the 
complainant or witness and any other person to whom, to the knowledge of the defendant, the 
record relates, at least seven days79 before the hearing which determines the outcome of the 
application.80  This hearing is held in camera and determines whether to order the record-
holder to produce it to the court for review by the judge.81 The record-holder, the complainant 
and any other person to whom the record relates may appear and make submissions at the 
hearing.82 The judge may order production of the record where s/he is satisfied that: 
(a) the application was made in accordance with the correct procedures; 
(b) the accused has established that the record is likely relevant to an issue at trial or to 
the competence of a witness to testify; and 
(c) the production of the record is necessary in the interests of justice.83 
 
There is also a list of factors which the judge must consider when making a decision on 
production. Section 278.5(2) provides that the judge  
“shall consider the salutary and deleterious effects of the determination on the 
accused’s right to make a full answer and defence and on the right to privacy and 
equality of the complainant or witness, as the case may be, and any other person to 
whom the record relates”.  
 
Specifically, the judge must examine: 
                                                          
79 The judge may permit a shorter period of time if this is appropriate in the interests of justice: s. 278.3(5).  
80 S. 278.3(5). The judge may also order service on other persons to whom the record may relate: s. 278.3(6).  
81 S. 278.4(1). 
82 They are not, however, compellable as witnesses at the hearing: s. 278.4(2).  
83 S. 278.5(1).  
(a) the extent to which the record is necessary for the accused to make a full answer and 
defence; 
(b) the probative value of the record; 
(c) the nature and extent of the reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the 
record; 
(d) whether production of the record is based on a discriminatory belief or bias; 
(e) the potential prejudice to the personal dignity and right to privacy of any person to 
whom the record relates; 
(f) society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual offences; 
(g) society’s interest in encouraging the obtaining of treatment by complainants of sexual 
offences; and 
(h) the effect of the determination on the integrity of the trial process.  
 
If the judge orders that the record, or part thereof, should be produced, this initiates the 
second stage of the application process (i.e. disclosure stage). The judge must review the 
material in the absence of the parties and determine whether disclosure should be made to the 
defendant.84 The judge may hold another hearing in camera.85 Where the judge is satisfied 
that the record or part thereof is likely relevant and its production is necessary in the interests 
of justice, s/he may make a disclosure order.86  When deciding whether to order disclosure, 
the judge must again be guided by section 278.5.87 Where the judge orders the disclosure or 
partial disclosure, s/he may impose conditions, such as that: the record be edited as per the 
judge’s directions; copying of the record is restricted or prohibited; contents of the record 
may not be disclosed to others without court approval or; the record be viewed only at the 
court offices.88 Such conditions encourage proportionality and help to ensure that any 
disclosure goes no further than is necessary in the interests of justice.89 
 
                                                          
84 S. 278.6(1). 
85 S. 278.6(2). 
86 As is seen below, such disclosure may be subject to conditions: s. 278.8(1).  
87 The judge must “consider the salutary and deleterious effects of the determination on the accused’s right to 
make a full answer and defence and on the right to privacy and equality of the complainant or witness, as the 
case may be, and any other person to whom the record relates and, in particular, shall take the factors specified 
in paragraphs 278.5(2)(a) to (h) into account”: s. 278.7(2). 
88 S. 278.7(3).  
89 The section specifically provides that the “judge may impose conditions on the production to protect the 
interests of justice and, to the greatest extent possible, the privacy and equality interests of the complainant or 
witness, as the case may be, and any other person to whom the record relates”: s. 278.7(3).  
Assessing the Suitability of the Canadian Scheme for Adoption in England 
Although section 278 is not dissimilar to the English rules, there are a number of key 
differences which make it a superior approach. Both frameworks are based upon formal 
application processes but section 278 provides a unified approach with one central 
application point. This is more straightforward than the English system where there are three 
alternative routes to disclosure, each with slightly differing procedures. A streamlined 
process reduces the potential for uncertainty or misapplication of procedures. Further, 
applying the same rules to all records, whoever controls them, is sensible as similar concerns 
about unwarranted use of these records apply whether the material is in the hands of the 
prosecution or a third party. Allowing the complainant to waive the application of the scheme 
where the prosecution holds the record allows for avoidance of the formal process where the 
complainant consents. This is similar to the English law where the complainant can consent 
to disclosure of records. However, the section 278 consent process is much simpler as there 
are no concerns about qualified consent and attendant PII implications. The problems 
outlined in the HMCPSI research about failure to accurately record the level of consent given 
are also obviated. Under section 278, the complainant either consents to release of the records 
or the full disclosure regime applies.  
 
Like the English rules, section 278 is discretionary. However, judicial discretion is structured 
by detailed guidelines which encourage more consistent and predictable results. Certainly, 
maintaining discretion, even in a structured way, allows a margin for erroneous or 
conservative application of the rules. Indeed, judicial interpretation of section 278 has not 
been entirely progressive. In R. v Mills90, it was held that when making decisions at the 
production and disclosure stages, a judge is not required to engage in a conclusive and in-
depth analysis of all of the factors listed in section 278.5(2) but is only required to “take them 
into account”.91 Gotell argues that “the Mills majority transforms [the section 278.5(2) 
criteria] into a ‘checklist’ of various factors which ‘may come into play during a judge’s 
deliberation’”92 rather than “a list of considerations to frame the analysis of likely 
                                                          
90 [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668.  
91 Ibid, at 675 and 753, respectively.  
92 L. Gotell, “The Ideal Victim, The Hysterical Complainant, and the Disclosure of Confidential Records: The 
Implications of the Charter for Sexual Assault Law” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 251, 270. 
relevance”.93  There are indications that the judicial interpretation of section 278 has 
undermined its effectiveness. Research by Gotell94 found that judicial analysis of whether 
production or disclosure was “necessary in the interests of justice” was “for the most part, 
succinct and economical to the extreme” and that judges render decisions “without ever 
showing their actual reasoning”.95 She also saw that decisions “emphasize the pre-eminence 
of fair trial rights” and do not accord proper consideration or weight to complainants’ rights 
and societal interests.96  
 
 However, whilst Gotell’s research has highlighted some shortcomings, there is also 
evidence of progressive interpretations of section 278. For example, in R. v Batte97 it was 
held that to justify production, “the accused must be able to point to something in the 
record…that suggests that the records contain information that is not already available to the 
defence”.98 Although Gotell’s research suggests that the judgment is not universally 
followed99, it shows judicial support for the intention behind section 278 and careful 
application of the scheme. Judicial commitment to protection of personal records is also 
apparent in judges’ refusal to allow access to records where the legislative requirements are 
not met.100 Gotell’s research demonstrates that the courts are filtering out unmeritorious 
applications. Of the 16 cases examined in her study, the scheme was held to apply in 14. Of 
these cases, 7 applications were dismissed, 7 resulted in the production of at least some 
records to the court and 5 led to disclosure of records or edited portions of records to the 
defendant.101 This is, admittedly, a small sample. It would be unsafe to draw definitive 
conclusions from it. However, the results indicate the types of decisions that are being made 
and provide cause for optimism about the benefits of section 278. While there have been 
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94 L. Gotell, “Tracking decisions on Access to Sexual Assault Complainants’ Confidential Records: The 
Continued Permeability of Subsections 278.1-278.9 of the Criminal Code” (2008) 20 Canadian Journal of 
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97 [2000] 49 O.R. (3d) 321 (Ontario Court of Appeal). 
98 [2000] 49 O.R. (3d) 321, 341.  
99 Gotell, “Tracking Decisions on Access to Sexual Assault Complainants’ Confidential Records” (2008) 20 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 111, 128-132.  
100 For examples of such cases, see: Ibid, at 132-137. 
101 Ibid, at 127-128. 
some slippages in interpretation, this is inevitable where discretion is maintained and there 
are some measures (discussed below) which could minimise the potential for regressive 
application of the section 278 guidelines. Generally, the regime has yielded positive results 
and the introduction of a scheme like this offers the prospect of fairer results for 
complainants.   
 
 It might be argued that adoption of a tailored regime like section 278 is unnecessary. 
Modification of the existing disclosure provisions to provide guidelines for the exercise of 
judicial discretion could be sufficient. However, there is a strong justification for special 
procedural rules in sexual offence cases. As noted in a recent study on the investigation and 
prosecution of rape: 
“Rape is a unique crime in that it is the state of mind of each of the suspect and the 
complainant that transforms what in other circumstances would be a normal, lawful 
human interaction, into an indictable crime. …[I]t is therefore vital for there to be 
recognition of the inherent unique challenges and complexity of investigating and 
prosecuting these crimes when compared to other serious crime against a person…”102 
 
Since these cases amount to “swearing contests”, anything which challenges the credibility of 
the complainant or defendant is of utmost significance and could be instrumental in jurors’ 
assessment of the evidence. The impact of personal records is far greater in a sexual offence 
trial than in any other criminal trial. The significance of personal records is compounded 
when one remembers that “myth, prejudice and disbelief surround the reporting, investigation 
and prosecution of sexual assault, producing a ‘culture of scepticism’”.103 The potential for 
advocates to focus on stereotypes to undermine complainants’ credibility by suggesting they 
are prone to mendacity or are not “worthy” victims is particularly acute in sexual offence 
trials where rape myths provide a compelling backdrop to juror deliberations. Special rules of 
evidence have always applied in sexual offence cases (e.g. rules on the admission of sexual 
history evidence). A regime regulating disclosure of personal records thus fits neatly within 
existing sexual offences legislation. Moreover, creation of a separate regime for disclosure in 
sexual offence trials would symbolically mark this area out for special attention and 
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June, 2015) 
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hopefully stimulate a fresh approach to this type of evidence, maximising the potential for 
progressive application of the new rules.  
 There is a good case to be made for introducing a regime similar to section 278 into 
English law. To maximise the potential for progressive application of such a framework and 
seek to offset some of the potential pitfalls highlighted by Gotell’s research, a number of 
measures can be taken. To ensure that judges engage in a proper balancing exercise, taking 
into account all of the listed factors when deciding whether to grant production and 
disclosure, there should be a requirement for written decisions. This practice is already part of 
PII applications104 and continuing to require this will ensure that judges do not make hasty or 
ill-considered decisions as this will be readily apparent from their recorded decision.  
 
 It is also important that legal aid is provided to record-holders and complainants.105 
Lack of funding for independent legal counsel for complainants and record-holders has 
proved problematic in Canada. Of the 16 cases in Gotell’s study, complainants and record-
holders were, respectively, represented in only 7.106 For record-holders, the unavailability of 
legal aid means that they must either use already scarce resources to fund legal representation 
or do without it, raising the potential that their interests will not be properly represented. For 
complainants, inadequate funding prevents them from impressing their objections to 
disclosure effectively upon the court. Extension of those eligible for legal aid is not 
uncontroversial given recent debates in this area.107 Nevertheless, giving complainants and 
record-holders the opportunity to be heard in applications for disclosure is pointless if they 
cannot afford legal representation to articulate the arguments against disclosure effectively. 
Appropriate legal aid is vital to ensure that a scheme replicating section 278 is fully 
workable.  
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There are also a number of extra-legal initiatives which would buttress the introduction of a 
regime like section 278 and maximise its potential to properly control the disclosure of 
personal records in sexual offence trials. First, information on the new rules and the 
underlying ethos of the regime should be incorporated into the existing training provided to 
“sex-ticketed” judges to ensure that judges apply the guidelines appropriately when 
exercising their discretion.108 Further, training should encourage judges to carefully monitor 
cross-examination about the contents of personal records so that complainants are not 
subjected to unnecessary invasion of privacy or prejudice. Best practice guidelines for record-
holders should also be introduced to make sure that they properly defend disclosure 
applications. Finally, once introduced, the scheme should be monitored to ascertain whether 
it is working according to legislative intention.  
 
Conclusion 
The CPIA and the witness summons procedure have filled the lacuna in sexual offences law 
relating to the disclosure of personal records. However, applying general rules to a 
contentious area has generated complexities and uncertainty. The current approach is no 
substitute for a bespoke regime which is specifically designed to achieve justice in this 
difficult area. The current rules are not sufficiently nuanced to ensure that the interests of 
complainants, the fair trial rights of defendants and wider societal interests in the proper 
treatment of victims and the punishment of offenders are appropriately accommodated in 
disclosure decisions. The Canadian rules provide a workable alternative. Certainly, the 
Canadian scheme is “still a discretionary one (and thereby subject to the vagaries of the 
particular judge applying it)”.109 However, it “has an educational validity” and draws “public 
and judicial attention to the particular issues which are raised by disclosure of confidential 
records in sexual cases”.110 The English legislature should give serious consideration to the 
introduction of a regime like section 278. Given the trauma faced by sexual offence 
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complainants when testifying in trials, any method of easing their passage through the 
criminal justice system should be explored as a matter of priority.   
